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This paper investigates the determinants of swap spreads. Compared with previous work done in 
this area, such as the seminal paper by Duffie and Singleton (1997), the paper includes daily 
credit spreads data in the time series framework. The issue is whether “liquidity” or “credit” (or 
both) is the main determinant of swap spreads dynamics. Our results agree with the prevailing 
view among swap traders that swap spreads are mainly an indicator of “market liquidity”. 
However, the dynamics are influenced significantly by “credit” over longer horizons, although 
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 Swap spreads1 have started playing a crucial role in ﬁnancial markets. Although there are many
papers investigating the determinants of interest rate swap spreads, none of them has empirically ex-
amined the issue using data on relevant credit spreads. Most stylized facts about potential forces that
drive swap spreads diverge.
At the outset we see that markets interpret swap spreads in three different ways. First, they can be
viewed as an “effective proxy for banking liquidity2”. This interpretation is consistent with the formal
derivation of the swap rate as an average (under the appropriate forward measure) of future LIBOR
rates. A second interpretation of swap spreads is that they are mostly a proxy for the AA- credit
spreads, although often this is contradicted in reality by the spreads paid by AAA rated borrowers such
as Fannie Mae. Third, one can claim that recently swap spreads have been signiﬁcantly affected by
government efforts to manage national debt, as Ministries of Finance from France to Germany have
started adjusting their debt proﬁle through swaps. Our paper is essentially an empirical investigation of
these views utilizing recent data.
According to Grinblatt (1995) the liquidity difference between one-month LIBOR and one-month
Treasury bill yield alone can explain interest rate swap spreads very well. Credit spreads are assumed
to have little impact on the swap spreads term structure and hence are not incorporated in his one-factor
model.
Lang et al. (1998) use 10- and 5-year average swap spreads data to analyze the impact of the
changes of the counterparty risk in swaps on swap spreads. They ﬁnd that swap spreads increase if
either single-A spreads (lower credit rated bond spreads) or agency spreads (higher credit rated bond
spreads) increase. They also conclude that swap spreads contain procyclical element, and that the
business cycle factor affects the default risk of single A ﬁrms. However, their work is constrained by
the fact that swap spreads are examined solely from the perspective of the bargaining power between
counterparties over the swap surplus and of the business cycle element.
1In the US, swap spreads are quoted simply as spreads over the comparable maturity treasuries.
2International Financing Review, June 29, 2002.
2He(2000)arguesthatcounterpartydefaultriskcanbeignoredbecauseaswapcontractisessentially
a Master Swap Agreement3. Using a multi-factor model, he concludes that swap spreads are equivalent
to the present value of LIBOR over GC4-repo rates properly amortized over the swap maturity.
To date the seminal paper dealing with this issue is Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997). The VAR regres-
sions in their paper contain four variables, with the intention to capture the swap spreads’ own effect
and the effects of risk-free rates, liquidity and credit risk on swap spreads. They reveal that the shocks
to swap spreads per se can account for almost half of their own variations over two years, and that
both corporate credit risk and liquidity have impact on swap zero spreads. While “liquidity effects are
short-lived”, “credit effects are weak initially” but “increase in importance” over the longer horizon.
Their ﬁnding also indicates that liquidity-repo effect and demands for the ﬁxed leg of swaps contribute
to the variation of swap spreads.
Our paper builds on Dufﬁe and Singleton’s work and brings in empirical data on credit spreads,
OTR (on-the-run) Treasuries and LIBOR. Such daily data were not available until the last few years.
Using such daily data permits us to separate out explicitly the effect of credit spread movements from
liquidity considerations. As expected, we obtain much sharper results. Also, compared to the extant
literature, our data are ﬁner and more updated. The latter is quite relevant, because during the period
from January 1999 to March 2002 there were major events such as the Y2K liquidity problem, US
Treasury buy-backs and the September 11 aftermath. Hence, more pronounced movements in swap
rates were observed and this makes the results more meaningful. Another important feature observed
during this time span is that the US Government became more active in the swap market, and this may
have dramatically changed the character of the market. One could claim that swap spreads have become
independent risk factors in their own right.
In this paper we try to see which factor or factors drive swap spreads, if any. We study the time
series dynamics of swap spreads, LIBOR, credit spreads and US OTR Treasury yield curve, in order to
determine the effects of these factors on swap spreads individually and then in terms of cointegrating
vectors.
3Comprehensive documentation of standard terms and conditions covering all swap transactions between two counterpar-
ties. Usually based on standard documents prepared by the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA).
4General Collateral.
3The paper is organized as follows: We start with a theoretical framework for swaps in Section I.
Next, a description of the data set is given in Section II, followed by a discussion of the swap spreads
dynamics in Section III. Our regression is based on a VAR (vector autoregression) model and key re-
sults are drawn from Granger causality tests, innovation accounting, cointegration and error correction
analyses. Finally we conclude in Section IV.
I. A Framework for Swaps
This section sets the terminology and notation.
We work with forward ﬁxed-payer interest rate swaps. These are vanilla products in the sense that
the contracts are pre-designed and homogeneous, very liquid (the bid-ask spreads are very tight), and
every market player is familiar with their properties. It is worth repeating the relevant parameters again,
given the somewhat more technical approach the paper will adopt.
1. The notional amount is N, the tenor of the underlying LIBOR rate is 6 months.
2. Swap maturity T is ten years. The swap contract is signed at time to but starts at time t1, hence
the term forward swap.
3. The dates fti;i = 1;:::;n¡1g are reset dates where the relevant LIBOR rate, fLtig will be
determined.5 These dates are apart d time units, with d = 1=2.
4. The dates fti;i = 2;:::;ng are settlement dates where the LIBOR rates are used to exchange the
ﬂoating cash ﬂows dNLti against the ﬁxed one dNsto at each ti+1. sto is the swap rate.
We need to deﬁne the default-free pure discount bonds. A buyer pays the current price B(to;Ti) of
these bonds at to to receive 1 dollar in the same currency at maturity dates Ti = ti. Given that these
bonds are default-free, the time ti payoffs are certain and the price B(to;Ti) can be considered as the
value today of $1 to be received at time ti. This means they are in fact the relevant discount factors, or
in market language simply discounts for ti, since credit risk is assumed away. Note that as,
T1 < ¢¢¢ < Tn; (1)
5That is, determined by some objective and pre-deﬁned authority such as the British Bankers Association.
4bond prices must satisfy the following, regardless of the slope of the yield curve:6
B(to;T1) > ¢¢¢ > B(to;Tn) (2)
Hence, these bonds can be used to adjust to the present, values of various cash ﬂows occurring at future
settlement dates. They are likely to be quite useful in dealing with successive swap cash ﬂows.
The third major component of the framework is a series of Forward Rate Agreements (FRA) paid-
in-arrears. For each FRA, a ﬂoating (random) payment is made against a known (ﬁxed) payment for a
net payment of,
[Lti ¡F(to;ti)]Nd (3)
at times ti+1. Here, the fF(to;ti)g denotes the forward rates.
A. Equivalence of Cash Flows
We now obtain a series of arbitrage relationships concerning swap rates. First, note that the FRA
contracts imply a certain equivalence. There is a strip of ﬂoating cash ﬂows:
fNdLt1;¢¢¢;NdLtn¡1g (4)
and according to observed liquid prices, the market is willing to exchange these (random) cash ﬂows
against the known (ﬁxed) cash ﬂow:
fNdF(to;t1);¢¢¢;NdF(to;tn¡1)g: (5)
This means something important. If the markets in these FRA’s are liquid and well functioning at time
to, the cash ﬂow sequence in (5) is perceived by the markets as the correct sequence to exchange against
the ﬂoating payments (4). But, when we go to the swap cash ﬂows, we see that exactly the same ﬂoating
cash ﬂow sequence (4) is being exchanged for the known and ﬁxed swap leg cash ﬂow,
6If one shorts one longer term bond to fund a long position in one short term bond, one would not have enough money
using discount bonds.
5fNdsto;¢¢¢;Ndstog (6)
and exactly at the same time periods. During both of these exchanges neither counterparty makes any
cash payments at time to. But, this means that we can put these two exchanges together at time to and
get the following conclusion.
² The market is willing to exchange the ﬁxed and known cash ﬂow
fNdsto;¢¢¢;Ndstog (7)
against the variable but again known cash ﬂows:
fNdF(to;t1);¢¢¢;NdF(to;tn¡1)g; (8)
with no additional time to compensation.
This has an important implication. It means that the current values of these two known (ﬁxed) cash
ﬂows should be the same. Otherwise one counterparty would demand an initial cash payment. Given
that these two sequences of cash ﬂows are known as of time to, this equivalence gives an equation that
can be used in pricing as discussed next. These informal arguments will be proven formally using the
Forward LIBOR model.
B. Pricing the Swap
We have determined two known cash ﬂows the market is willing to exchange at no additional cost.
Using this we can now calculate the time to values of the two cash ﬂows. In order to do this we use the
third component of the framework, namely the discount bond prices.
6For a moment suppose the pure discount bonds B(to;Ti);i = 1;¢¢¢;n are liquid, actively traded, and
are “correctly ” priced. This means that we can use fB(to;T2);¢¢¢;B(to;Tn)g to value cash ﬂows settled
at times t2;¢¢¢;tn. 7 In fact, the time-to value of the sequence of cash ﬂows:
fNdF(to;t1);¢¢¢;NdF(to;tn¡1)g (9)
will be given by multiplying each cash ﬂow by the discount factor that corresponds to that particular
settlement date. Bond prices play this role. Doing this for the FRA cash ﬂows ﬁrst, we obtain:8
[B(to;t2)F(to;t1)+¢¢¢+B(to;tn)F(to;tn¡1)]Nd (10)
The time to value of the ﬁxed swap cash ﬂows can be obtained similarly:
[B(to;t2)+¢¢¢+B(to;tn)]stoNd (11)
Now, according to the argument in the previous section, the values in (10) and (11) should be the same
if all markets are liquid. In other words, we must have:
[B(to;t2)F(to;t1)+¢¢¢+B(to;tn)F(to;tn¡1)]Nd = (12)
[B(to;t2)+¢¢¢+B(to;tn)]stoNd (13)
This equality has, at least, two important implications. First, it again implies that the value of the
swap at time to will be zero. Second, it can be used as an equation in order to determine the value of
one unknown. As a matter of fact, pricing the swap means determining a value for sto such that the









7The fact that we are using default free discount bonds to value a private party cash ﬂow indicates that we are assuming
away all counterparty or credit risk.
8Here we use the ti notation for the bond maturity Ti:
7This is a compact formula that ties together the three important components of the general ﬁxed income
framework and it has an appropriate interpretation.
B.1. Interpretation of the Swap Rate








According to this expression, we see that the “correct” swap rate is a weighted average of the FRA
paid-in-arrears rates during the life of the swap:
sto = w1F(to;t1)+¢¢¢+w1F(to;tn¡1) (16)















wi = 1 (19)
Thus the swap rate is an average paid-in-arrears FRA rate. It is important to emphasize that this is
true as long as the FRA’s under consideration are paid-in-arrears. For example, there are so-called
LIBOR-in-arrear FRA’s where a convexity adjustment needs to be taken into account to make these
arguments.9
9Note the difference in terminology. One instrument is paid-in-arrears, the other is LIBOR-in-arrears. Here the LIBOR of
the settlement time ti is used to determine the cash ﬂows. With paid-in-arrear FRA’s one uses the previous settlement date,
ti¡1 LIBOR.
8It is important to realize that these weights are obtained from pure discount bond prices, which are








The data used in this study are primarily from the Credit Suisse First Boston Liquid US Corporate In-
dex (LUCI) 10, which is a market capitalization weighted index of over 500 High Grade US Corporate
bonds. The index is separated into categories based on ratings by Moody’s Investor Service and Stan-
dard & Poor’s. Table I shows the statistics for each of the ratings categories represented in the index as
of July 15, 2002. The index itself is weighted toward the lower end of the ratings range.
All data within the various rating categories are the weighted average of all bonds within the group-
ing. Some indices include both liquid and illiquid securities and these indices are difﬁcult for investors
to replicate and may cause concern about the validity of the prices of bonds within the index. To avoid
this problem, the CSFB LUCI includes bonds that CSFB traders make markets in and tend to trade
more frequently than some bonds in other indices. The index includes all data on individual issues that
are then aggregated to get the statistics and weighted averages. The index includes bond yields and
spreads to various benchmarks, such as spread to benchmark treasury security and spread to swap rate.
There is no “missing” data within the LUCI index because all trading days are included and end of day
prices are given by traders. Only closures of the market cause any gaps in the data series.
For this paper, we derived the swap rate by subtracting the spread to swap from the yield of each
rating group. Therefore, we obtained the weighted average swap rate for the rating category. Then the
10Source: CSFB. All Rights Reserved. Used by permission. The analysis in this report was not created by CSFB and is for
informational purposes only and is not to be used or considered as an offer or a solicitation to sell or an offer or solicitation
to buy or subscribe for securities or other ﬁnancial instruments, nor to constitute any advice or recommendation with respect
to such securities or other ﬁnancial instruments. Information from CSFB has been obtained or derived from sources believed
by CSFB to be reliable, but CSFB makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. CSFB accepts no liability
for any loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report.
9swap spread is computed as the differential between the swap rate and the similar maturity US Treasury
Bond yield.
The data used for this paper are daily data from January 1999 to March 2002, including LUCI A
yields, LUCI A spreads to swap, LUCI A bench spreads, LUCI A modiﬁed duration11, OTR Treasuries
for both two year and ten year maturities, and the London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR).
III. Swap Spread Dynamics
We conduct our analysis within the framework of a vector autoregression (VAR) model12, which can

















































where, i = 1;:::;n denote n discrete time stochastic processes in the model at time t. The Aij(L) are






where m is the maximum lag length.
The ei(t) are the corresponding innovation processes with the following properties. It has zero
mean:
EP
t [e(t)] = 0 (23)
11Modiﬁed durations have already taken convexity into account.
12Employing the VAR methodology, we are able to assess the relative impact of the potential factors on swap spreads. It
carries out a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation within a system where all the variables included are treated
as endogenous. The advantage of this is both the instantaneous and the lagged effect of each factor on the swap spread can
be captured. Hence, the VAR approach is preferable to single OLS regressions.


































where the vectors e(t) are serially uncorrelated.
The variables included are swap spreads, 6-month LIBOR, modiﬁed duration, credit spread and
slope of the term structure. The swap spread is calculated as the differential between the swap rate
(derived from LUCI A) and the ten-year OTR Treasury13. The credit spread is proxied by LUCI A
benchmark spread, which captures default risk. The two-year OTR Treasury in conjunction with the
ten-year OTR Treasury effectively produce a yield curve slope term. This variable was found in earlier
work to be very relevant in explaining business cycle and interest rate dynamics. These variables will
be referred to as SwapSprd, LIBOR, Duration, Credit and Slope henceforth throughout this paper. Plots
for these variables are shown in Figure 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
A. Lag Length
One issue associated with specifying a VAR model is the lag length employed. Dufﬁe and Singleton
use eight lags in their VAR estimations. In order to determine the optimal lag length, we implement
a sequence of statistical tests of models with longer lags versus shorter lag lengths. The longer lag
models can be viewed as unrestricted models while the shorter lag version of the model as restricted
models. A likelihood ratio statistic is calculated to test for the signiﬁcance of imposing the restrictions.
If the restrictions are associated with a statistically signiﬁcant degradation in model ﬁt, we conclude
that the longer lag length model is more appropriate, rejecting the shorter lag model. The LR-ratio
results beginning from 21 lags down to 3 lags are given in Table II. At the 0.1 level, we reject 8 lags in
favor of 9 lags as the optimal lag length to be included in the subsequent estimations.
13Note that the A rating categories are near a ten-year average weighted maturity.
11B. Granger Causality
The coefﬁcients of the 9-lag model are shown in Table VI . Inferences of the Granger-causal impacts
from all the variables on swap spreads are drawn from the marginal probabilities based on Granger-
causality test. The Granger causality probabilities are given in Table III. When we examine the impacts
of all the variables on swap spreads using the 90% signiﬁcance level, it can be seen that, except LIBOR,
all the other variables display strong impact on swap spreads14.
C. Innovation Accounting
A perturbation in one innovation in the VAR sets up a chain reaction over time in all the variables.
Using impulse responses we examine the dynamic interactions between the variables in the model,
tracing the effect of a one standard deviation shock to the innovations on current and future values of
the endogenous variables.
As long as the innovations of the VAR are uncorrelated, interpreting the impulse response func-
tions is straightforward. Therefore, our regression incorporates a Cholesky decomposition of the error
covariance matrix to orthogonalize the innovations of the VAR15.
Having noticed the sensitivity of the impulse response functions to the ordering of the variables,
we try to minimize this undesirable feature by choosing the following order. Since we are interested
in discovering the potential factors that drive swap spreads, it makes sense that SwapSprd should enter
last. Assuming the term structure of the OTR Treasuries could affect all the other variables in the
system, we place Slope in the ﬁrst place. Next comes LIBOR, which might not determine the shape of
the term structure but could have a role to play in determining the other variables. Credit and Duration
are placed in the third and fourth place due to the same consideration.
14As we add more lags to the model, LIBOR increasingly gains momentum in affecting swap spreads and becomes very
signiﬁcant in longer lag models.
15Although the Cholesky decomposition is widely used, it is a rather arbitrary method of attributing common effects.
Changing the order of equations could dramatically change the impulse responses, although changing the order of the vari-
ables has no effect on the outcome of the Granger causality.
12C.1. Impulse Responses
Impulse response functions are estimated based on the VAR regressions. The graphical output of the
impulse responses of swap spreads to all the variables in the 9-lag model are shown respectively in
Figure 1. The shock to each equation is equal to one positive standard deviation of the equation residual
and the impulse responses of all the variables to the shock are traced out for a period of 728 days. The
plus/minus two standard deviation bands are displayed in the graphs alongside the impulse responses.
TheimpulseresponsesindicatethattheshapeofthetermstructureofOTRTreasurieshasanegative
effect on swap spreads. As the slope of the yield curve increases, swap spreads fall. This may be
interpreted as follows. An increase in the slope of the yield curve often means (especially in our
sample period) a cut in short-term ﬁnancing costs. Being an average of such (expected) costs in the
future, swap spreads reasonably tend to narrow.
Credit shocks, in the ﬁrst couple of weeks, positively affect swap spreads. After that, response
of swap spreads decreases following the impact of an increase in credit spreads. This is likely due to
hedging and position unwinding using swap, rather than cash, markets. Dufﬁe and Singleton used a
different proxy for credit spreads (“CPS”, the credit spread between BAAand AAA commercial paper),
but the same inverse relationship was found to be present between credit spreads and swap spreads.
In the case of shocks from modiﬁed durations, swap spreads essentially respond negatively in the
ﬁrst 100 days. The response turns positive and signiﬁcant after that. Finally, the effect of LIBOR is
comparatively weak and it has a positive relationship with swap spreads. An increase in the 6-month
LIBOR rate is accompanied by an insigniﬁcant rise in the swap spreads. Probably this is because both
LIBOR and the ﬁxed leg used to calculate swaps move in the same direction.
C.2. Variance Decomposition
Variance decomposition provides a different look into the system’s dynamics16. The variance decom-
position for swap spreads based on ﬁve-variable (Slope, LIBOR, Credit, Duration, and SwapSprd)
16As with the impulse response functions, the numerical variance decompositions are often very sensitive to the order in
which the original innovations are orthogonalized. Variance decomposition decomposes variation in an endogenous variable
into the component shocks to the endogenous variables in the VAR and gives information about the relative importance of
each random innovation to the variables in the VAR.
13VAR is summarized in Table IV. Results are presented in a way analogous to that of Dufﬁe and Sin-
gleton’s four-variable VAR. As is immediately evident, Slope and SwapSprd together explain almost
all of the forecast error variance of the swap spreads in the initial 100 days. The relative importance
of Slope goes down as the forecast horizon increases, but still makes a big contribution to the variance
decomposition. In 364 days it still explains 22% of the variance of SwapSprd.
By contrast, credit shocks are relatively unimportant in the beginning — explaining little of the
variance in SwapSprd, but after about 283 days its explanatory power exceeds that of Slope. In other
words, credit effects are of relatively more importance in the long run while liquidity effects have
stronger impact on swap spreads in the initial months. Although these similar patterns of liquidity and
credit effects on swap spreads emerge from our regressions as compared to those in the paper by Dufﬁe
and Singleton, it is noticeable that the percentages in the variance decomposition in our 9-lag model
start out quite large — with Slope (as the proxy for liquidity) and Credit accounting for 31% and 17%
respectively of the swap spreads variance. In Dufﬁe and Singleton’s paper, swap spreads show little
response to liquidity and credit at the outset (0.69% and 0.12%) but increase quickly in magnitude over
time. In two years, swap spreads’ own shocks still render major explanation to their variations (28%),
but not as dramatic as that found in Dufﬁe and Singleton’s (48%).
LIBOR enters as an insigniﬁcant component in the variance decomposition of swap spreads. It
appears that the slope of the yield curve is a good enough proxy for liquidity and LIBOR ceases to play
a major role in swap spread dynamics.
D. Vector Error Correction
VAR systems rest on the general proposition that economic variables tend to move together over time
and also are autocorrelated. When the variables in the VAR are integrated of one or more orders, unre-
stricted estimation in the previous section is subject to the hazards of regressions involving nonstation-
ary variables. However, the presence of nonstationary variables raises the possibility of cointegrating
relations.
Consider a set of economic variables in long-run equilibrium when:
14b1y1t +b2y2t +:::+bnynt = 0 (25)
Let b and yt denote the vector (b1;b2;:::;bn) and (y1t;y2t;:::;ynt)0, the system is in long-run equi-
librium when byt = 0. The deviation from long-run equilibrium—the equilibrium error—is et, so that
et = byt. If the equilibrium is meaningful, it must be the case that the equilibrium error process is
stationary.
In a vector error-correction (VEC) model, the short-term dynamics of the variables in the system
are inﬂuenced by the deviation from equilibrium. Formally, the (n£1) vector yt has an error-correction
representation if it can be expressed in the form:
Dyt = p0+pyt¡1+p1Dyt¡1+p2Dyt¡2+:::+ppDyt¡p+et (26)
where
p0= an (n£1) vector of intercept terms with elements pi0
p = is a matrix with elements pjk such that one or more of the pjk 6= 0
pi= (n£n) coefﬁcient matrices with elements pjk(i)
et= an (n£1) vector with elements eit
17
The key feature here is the presence of the matrix p. If all elements of p equal zero, the above
equation is just a traditional VAR in ﬁrst differences. In such circumstances, there is no error-correction
representation since Dyt does not respond to the previous period’s deviation from long-run equilibrium.
If one or more of the pjk differs from zero, Dyt responses to the previous period’s deviation from long-
run equilibrium. Hence, estimating pyt¡1 as a VAR in ﬁrst difference is inappropriate if yt has an
error-correction representation. The omission of the expression pyt¡1 entails a misspeciﬁcation error
if yt has an error-correction representation.
17Note that the disturbance terms are such that eit may be correlated with ejt.
15D.1. Estimation of Cointegrating Vectors
Table V reports the trace statistic and the critical values for the cointegration tests in the 9-lag model
by Johansen MLE. The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that the number of distinct cointegrating
vectors is less than or equal to r (the number of cointegrating relationships) against a general alterna-
tive18. Only one cointegrating vector is found at different signiﬁcance levels (90%, 95% and 99%).
The normalized cointegrating vector for the model is:
b = (2:1465;¡0:0520;¡0:0556;¡0:2945;0:0801):
D.2. Interpretation of Results
It is interesting to compare this cointegrating vector with the time series of Nasdaq composite index.
Figure 2 plots the two time series. The cointegrating vector from our model exhibits strikingly similar
movement patterns to those of Nasdaq composite index during the sample period. When the Nasdaq
stock market fell to its lowest level in years in the wake of September 11, the cointegrating vector
also made huge plunges around the same time. It turns out that there is a strong positive correlation
(0.517156) between the cointegrating vector and Nasdaq stock market. Figure 3 is a scatter plot of this
correlation relationship between the two.
The VEC model (with SwapSprd as the dependent variable) is reported in Table VII . The results
indicate that given the 9-lag model one cointegrating relationship was found, hence the inclusion of one
error correction variable into the model. The estimate for this error correction variable is labelled as ec
term Slope. The Granger-causality joint F-tests are also presented. It suggests that once cointegrating
relationship be taken into consideration, all the variables exert signiﬁcant inﬂuences on swap spreads.
18For instance, you can test the null hypothesis r · 0 against the alternative r = 1;2;3 or 4.
16IV. Conclusions
We have investigated whether factors, such as liquidity and credit, help predict and contribute to the
ﬂuctuations in the spreads between US dollar swaps and OTR Treasuries (both with ten-year maturity).
To assess the relative importance of Slope, LIBOR, Credit, Duration, and SwapSprd, vector autoregres-
sion method is used. By comparing our estimation results with those of Dufﬁe and Singleton’s, we are
able to identify a number of differences and similarities.
Our results reveal that liquidity (proxied by the slope of the OTR Treasury term structure) has a
negative effect on the change of the swap spreads and is highly signiﬁcant in determining the swap
spreads’ variation. On the contrary, Dufﬁe and Singleton ﬁnd a generally positive liquidity effect
(except that in the initial two weeks there is a small negative liquidity effect).
Using the benchmark spread of LUCI A as a proxy for credit, we ﬁnd that its role as a determinant
of swap spreads stands out over longer horizons. A widening of credit spreads is usually associated
with a narrowing of swap spreads. This turns out to be consistent with Dufﬁe and Singleton’s ﬁndings.
The dominant role of swap spreads’ own shocks in the share of the swap spreads’ variance has
likewise been observed. But only 27 percent of the variation of swap spreads in two years is attributable
to their own shocks in our model, much smaller than Dufﬁe and Singleton’s result, which is between 35
percent and 48 percent. In our case, the other variables like Slope, Credit and Duration have rendered
the major explanatory power to the swap spreads’ variance in a longer time frame. It is also notable that
modiﬁed duration gains relative importance in explaining the variation of swap spreads in two years.
Six-month LIBOR seems to have the weakest impact on swap spreads.
As we extend our analysis to the vector error correction model, one cointegrating relationship is
found to exist between all the variables in a 9-lag model. As such, in the long run the variables exhibit
a stable equilibrium relationship. Joint F-tests show that once we take cointegration into account, all
the variables exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on swap spreads.
At a minimum, our paper may serve as a pragmatic interpretation in the literature of swap spreads.
The empirical ﬁndings presented in this paper show that evidence based on the most recent US experi-
ence does indicate a close relationship between “liquidity” and swap spreads. Swap spreads should be
17mainly regarded as an indicator of “market liquidity”. By contrast, over longer horizons inﬂuence from
“credit” on swap spreads is more signiﬁcant.
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Figure 3. Correlation Between Nasdaq and the Cointegrating vector



















Figure 5. 6-month LIBOR

















Figure 7. Modiﬁed Duration









Figure 8. Swap Spread
25Table I
LUCI Statistics
AAA AA A BBB
No. of Issues 15 55 179 279
Par Amount 33.1 72.8 151.3 255.0
Market Value 34.6 76.2 159.0 258.5
Coupon 5.5 5.8 6.6 7.5
Remaining Term 9.9 6.9 10.4 12.2
Modiﬁed Duration 5.9 5.1 6.4 6.5
Yield 4.7 4.8 5.8 7.4
Benchmark Spread 61.2 77.5 137.5 291.5
Spread to Swap 24.8 43.4 100.1 233.9
Note: Par Amount and Market Value in millions; Bench Spread and Spread to Swap in basis points.
Source: CSFB as of July 15, 2002.
26Table II
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
Lag Length LR statistic Probability
21 vs. 20 23.0974 0.5719
20 vs. 19 25.9586 0.4098
19 vs. 18 20.8063 0.7034
18 vs. 17 25.0064 0.462
17 vs. 16 23.5383 0.5462
16 vs. 15 27.0072 0.3555
15 vs. 14 31.7995 0.1639
14 vs. 13 10.0816 0.9964
13 vs. 12 17.5627 0.8604
12 vs. 11 21.0271 0.6911
11 vs. 10 17.0623 0.8795
10 vs. 9 33.4940 0.1192
9 vs. 8 36.7198 0.06137
8 vs. 7 26.2165 0.3961
7 vs. 6 18.3662 0.8265
6 vs. 5 28.4798 0.2862
5 vs. 4 26.1595 0.3991
4 vs. 3 24.8716 0.4696
Note: Using 90% signiﬁcance level, we ﬁnd that the optimal lag length to use in the VAR regressions is 9.
27Table III
Granger Causality Test
Marginal Probabilities for 9-lag Model
Variable Slope LIBOR Credit Duration SwapSprd
Slope 0.00 0.20 0.22 0.45 0.73
LIBOR 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Credit 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.14 0.01
Duration 0.72 0.64 0.67 0.00 0.25
SwapSprd 0.10 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The columns reﬂect the Granger-causal impact of the column-variables on the row-variables.
Therefore the last row reﬂects the Granger-causal impacts from all the variables on swap spreads.
28Table IV
Variance Decomposition of Swap Spreads
9-lag Model
Horizon (days ahead) SLOPE LIBOR CREDIT DURATION SWAPSPRD
7 31.38 1.69 17.43 0.72 48.78
28 43.33 1.25 7.30 3.18 44.93
56 41.40 2.48 11.21 4.11 40.80
182 28.23 7.83 22.30 3.29 38.36
364 22.06 8.14 23.75 14.19 31.87
546 19.60 7.37 22.20 22.35 28.47
728 18.78 7.06 21.36 25.01 27.79
Dufﬁe & Singleton (VAR4)
Horizon (weeks ahead) TB6 REPOSP CPS ZEROSP10
1 2.44 0.69 0.12 96.75
4 6.29 2.74 0.13 90.85
8 12.00 11.90 0.16 75.95
26 15.26 12.88 6.98 64.88
52 12.84 18.60 16.75 51.81
78 11.55 19.88 19.46 49.11
104 11.12 20.13 20.29 48.46
Note: The columns give the percentage of the variance due to each innovation; each row adds up to 100.
TB6: 6-month Treasury bill rate; REPOSP: spread between generic and on-the-run repo rates for ten-year Treasury bonds;
CPS: spread between BAA- and AAA-rated commercial paper; ZEROSP10: spread between ten-year zero rates implied by
the swap and Treasury markets.
29Table V
Johansen MLE
(Cointegration Test in the 9-lag Model)
NULL: Trace Statistic Crit90% Crit95% Crit99%
r · 0 Slope 80.853 65.820 69.819 77.820
r · 1 LIBOR 34.254 44.493 47.855 54.682
r · 2 Credit 15.139 27.067 29.796 35.463
r · 3 Duration 5.108 13.429 15.494 19.935
r · 4 SwapSprd 0.801 2.705 3.841 6.635
Note: Only one cointegrating vector emerges using all the signiﬁcance levels.
30Table VI
VAR Estimation (9-lag Model)
SLOPE LIBOR CREDIT DURATION SWAPSPRD
SLOPE(-1) 1.156129 -0.284956 12.07809 -0.055433 -6.783791
(0.04213) (0.05204) (2.44957) (0.05190) (2.73273)
(27.4402) (-5.47553) (4.93070) (-1.06800) (-2.48243)
SLOPE(-2) -0.167378 0.052479 -12.74352 0.039136 2.447470
(0.06199) (0.07657) (3.60412) (0.07637) (4.02073)
(-2.70004) (0.68537) (-3.53582) (0.51247) (0.60871)
SLOPE(-3) -0.018960 0.175249 -1.986894 0.088273 1.354857
(0.06232) (0.07698) (3.62342) (0.07678) (4.04227)
(-0.30422) (2.27653) (-0.54835) (1.14975) (0.33517)
SLOPE(-4) 0.075747 0.006580 -1.221328 -0.045428 -0.810746
(0.06271) (0.07746) (3.64609) (0.07726) (4.06756)
(1.20783) (0.08495) (-0.33497) (-0.58802) (-0.19932)
SLOPE(-5) -0.055674 0.042019 4.137361 0.036536 0.276911
(0.06251) (0.07721) (3.63410) (0.07700) (4.05419)
(-0.89069) (0.54424) (1.13848) (0.47448) (0.06830)
SLOPE(-6) -0.074659 -0.093024 2.750332 -0.045643 2.399993
(0.06253) (0.07724) (3.63557) (0.07703) (4.05582)
(-1.19394) (-1.20437) (0.75651) (-0.59251) (0.59174)
SLOPE(-7) 0.121963 0.145571 -5.984812 0.022662 -0.577434
(0.06278) (0.07754) (3.64992) (0.07734) (4.07183)
(1.94274) (1.87729) (-1.63971) (0.29303) (-0.14181)
SLOPE(-8) -0.163095 -0.031127 2.941710 -0.010571 5.472529
(0.06324) (0.07812) (3.67702) (0.07791) (4.10206)
(-2.57879) (-0.39845) (0.80003) (-0.13567) (1.33409)
SLOPE(-9) 0.103514 -0.011295 -0.549655 -0.034813 -4.478034
(0.04393) (0.05426) (2.55414) (0.05412) (2.84939)
(2.35627) (-0.20816) (-0.21520) (-0.64327) (-1.57158)
LIBOR(-1) 0.007448 0.882921 0.073627 -0.033583 3.350260
(0.03042) (0.03757) (1.76840) (0.03747) (1.97282)
(0.24487) (23.5006) (0.04163) (-0.89625) (1.69821)
31LIBOR(-2) -0.004559 0.074908 -1.573553 0.026737 -2.672738
(0.04039) (0.04989) (2.34809) (0.04975) (2.61951)
(-0.11288) (1.50159) (-0.67014) (0.53739) (-1.02032)
LIBOR(-3) 0.048930 0.030585 0.220361 0.040739 -1.320940
(0.04044) (0.04995) (2.35090) (0.04981) (2.62265)
(1.21007) (0.61236) (0.09373) (0.81784) (-0.50367)
LIBOR(-4) -0.004832 -0.003009 0.033280 -0.023884 -1.103173
(0.04073) (0.05031) (2.36786) (0.05017) (2.64157)
(-0.11865) (-0.05982) (0.01405) (-0.47605) (-0.41762)
LIBOR(-5) -0.033191 -0.075700 4.182475 -0.026291 0.285899
(0.04066) (0.05023) (2.36417) (0.05009) (2.63746)
(-0.81623) (-1.50714) (1.76911) (-0.52484) (0.10840)
LIBOR(-6) -0.041360 0.038025 -2.870070 0.033870 1.825956
(0.04089) (0.05051) (2.37724) (0.05037) (2.65204)
(-1.01153) (0.75290) (-1.20731) (0.67242) (0.68851)
LIBOR(-7) 0.056406 0.00133 0.766227 -0.028386 1.329779
(0.04052) (0.05005) (2.35585) (0.04992) (2.62818)
(1.39202) (0.14252) (0.32524) (-0.56865) (0.50597)
LIBOR(-8) -0.024681 0.060465 -1.249408 -0.065977 -4.630753
(0.04042) (0.04992) (2.34982) (0.04979) (2.62145)
(-0.61066) (1.21117) (-0.53170) (-1.32512) (-1.76649)
LIBOR(-9) -0.012411 -0.022657 0.336168 0.076914 2.971697
(0.02908) (0.03592) (1.69078) (0.03583) (1.88623)
(-0.42676) (-0.63074) (0.19882) (2.14689) (1.57547)
CREDIT(-1) -0.000385 -0.000532 1.175622 -0.001402 0.070726
(0.00070) (0.00086) (0.04063) (0.00086) (0.04533)
(-0.55075) (-0.61627) (28.9333) (-1.62838) (1.56028)
CREDIT(-2) 0.000159 -0.001784 -0.096990 0.001343 -0.042658
(0.00106) (0.00131) (0.06172) (0.00131) (0.06886)
(0.14973) (-1.36040) (-1.57145) (1.02720) (-0.61953)
CREDIT(-3) 0.000906 0.002111 -0.065019 -0.000544 0.036392
(0.00106) (0.00131) (0.06161) (0.00131) (0.06873)
(0.85487) (1.61265) (-1.05535) (-0.41651) (0.52948)
32CREDIT(-4) 5.52E-05 -0.000759 0.050329 0.000402 -0.081298
(0.00106) (0.00131) (0.06157) (0.00130) (0.06869)
(0.05214) (-0.58041) (0.81743) (0.30850) (-1.18359)
CREDIT(-5) -0.000371 0.000175 -0.041510 -0.000928 -0.048088
(0.00106) (0.00130) (0.06139) (0.00130) (0.06849)
(-0.35158) (0.13389) (-0.67614) (-0.71316) (-0.70212)
CREDIT(-6) -0.000243 0.000984 -0.087311 0.000899 0.000407
(0.00105) (0.00130) (0.06130) (0.00130) (0.06839)
(-0.23000) (0.75521) (-1.42428) (0.69201) (0.00594)
CREDIT(-7) 0.000481 -0.001739 0.038817 -0.000317 -0.006096
(0.00105) (0.00130) (0.06125) (0.00130) (0.06833)
(0.45653) (-1.33673) (0.63373) (-0.24404) (-0.08922)
CREDIT(-8) 1.70E-05 0.000171 -0.007611 0.000902 -0.045425
(0.00105) (0.00129) (0.06080) (0.00129) (0.06783)
(0.01625) (0.13259) (-0.12519) (0.70052) (-0.66972)
CREDIT(-9) -0.000303 0.000982 0.011792 -0.000444 0.098735
(0.00068) (0.00084) (0.03934) (0.00083) (0.04389)
(-0.44818) (1.17544) (0.29972) (-0.53210) (2.24956)
DURATION(-1) -0.008405 -0.106800 -1.266328 0.876955 -3.522596
(0.03031) (0.03744) (1.76235) (0.03734) (1.96607)
(-0.27729) (-2.85245) (-0.71855) (23.4845) (-1.79170)
DURATION(-2) -0.002869 -0.031727 2.056544 0.104909 3.155302
(0.04057) (0.05011) (2.35874) (0.04998) (2.63140)
(-0.07072) (-0.63313) (0.87188) (2.09907) (1.19910)
DURATION(-3) 0.066410 0.082303 -2.217302 -0.029336 -5.361107
(0.04070) (0.05028) (2.36651) (0.05014) (2.64007)
(1.63153) (1.63699) (-0.93695) (-0.58504) (-2.03067)
DURATION(-4) -0.030069 0.036326 2.180759 -0.009732 2.922802
(0.04086) (0.05047) (2.37543) (0.05033) (2.65002)
(-0.73596) (0.71980) (0.91805) (-0.19335) (1.10294)
33DURATION(-5) -0.072570 -0.033712 -1.191931 0.055556 6.021877
(0.04087) (0.05048) (2.37586) (0.05034) (2.65050)
(-1.77585) (-0.66788) (-0.50168) (1.10357) (2.27198)
DURATION(-6) 0.046572 0.011570 0.602666 -0.012178 -6.683176
(0.04110) (0.05077) (2.38957) (0.05063) (2.66580)
(1.13311) (0.22791) (0.25221) (-0.24052) (-2.50701)
DURATION(-7) 0.042292 0.041494 -0.945690 -0.043000 -0.669220
(0.04129) (0.05101) (2.40081) (0.05087) (2.67833)
(1.02416) (0.81351) (-0.39390) (-0.84529) (-0.24986)
DURATION(-8) -0.039877 0.057658 -1.510585 0.007235 4.482273
(0.04093) (0.05055) (2.37953) (0.05042) (2.65459)
(-0.97431) (1.14053) (-0.63483) (0.14351) (1.68850)
DURATION(-9) 0.002838 -0.058048 1.288023 0.039648 -1.188611
(0.03082) (0.03807) (1.79177) (0.03797) (1.99888)
(0.09208) (-1.52491) (0.71886) (1.04432) (-0.59464)
SWAPSPRD(-1) -0.000739 0.002768 0.154567 -0.002307 1.029436
(0.00070) (0.00086) (0.04042) (0.00086) (0.04509)
(-1.06343) (3.22395) (3.82446) (-2.69406) (22.8321)
SWAPSPRD(-2) 0.001026 -0.002017 -0.132213 0.002534 -0.112264
(0.00096) (0.00119) (0.05594) (0.00119) (0.06240)
(1.06612) (-1.69732) (-2.36362) (2.13777) (-1.79903)
SWAPSPRD(-3) -0.000691 -0.001348 -0.057497 0.000121 -0.064020
(0.00097) (0.00120) (0.05641) (0.00120) (0.06293)
(-0.71169) (-1.12464) (-1.01921) (0.10154) (-1.01725)
SWAPSPRD(-4) -0.000711 0.000857 -0.022170 -0.000639 0.139262
(0.00097) (0.00120) (0.05626) (0.00119) (0.06276)
(-0.73483) (0.71695) (-0.39408) (-0.53639) (2.21898)
SWAPSPRD(-5) 0.001657 -0.000395 0.073311 0.000406 -0.028574
(0.00097) (0.00120) (0.05625) (0.00119) (0.06276)
(1.71238) (-0.33039) (1.30324) (0.34040) (-0.45531)
SWAPSPRD(-6) -0.000703 -0.000129 -0.017112 -0.000181 0.006977
(0.00097) (0.00119) (0.05616) (0.00119) (0.06265)
(-0.72754) (-0.10825) (-0.30471) (-0.15250) (0.11136)
34SWAPSPRD(-7) 0.000108 0.001999 -0.021696 0.001057 0.027017
(0.00096) (0.00119) (0.05609) (0.00119) (0.06257)
(0.11219) (1.67742) (-0.38681) (0.88936) (0.43178)
SWAPSPRD(-8) -0.000536 -0.001924 0.032272 -0.000364 0.093320
(0.00096) (0.00119) (0.05600) (0.00119) (0.06247)
(-0.55597) (-1.61748) (0.57627) (-0.30650) (1.49374)
SWAPSPRD(-9) 0.000411 0.000773 -0.016276 -0.000840 -0.112791
(0.00069) (0.00085) (0.04016) (0.00085) (0.04481)
(0.59453) (0.90578) (-0.40524) (-0.98675) (-2.51728)
C -0.002587 0.047106 10.65125 0.091300 9.570999
(0.06219) (0.07682) (3.61579) (0.07661) (4.03376)
(-0.04160) (0.61321) (2.94576) (1.19168) (2.37272)
R-squared 0.998154 0.999361 0.995324 0.995211 0.995097
Adj. R-squared 0.998041 0.999322 0.995039 0.994919 0.994799
Sum sq. resids 0.819743 1.250667 2770.882 1.244021 3448.506
S.E. equation 0.033328 0.041166 1.937675 0.041057 2.161660
F-statistic 8867.608 25643.30 3490.995 3408.147 3328.803
Log likelihood 1577.916 1412.319 -1607.353 1414.408 -1693.112
Akaike AIC -3.907949 -3.485508 4.217736 -3.490836 4.436511
Schwarz SC -3.634272 -3.211831 4.491413 -3.217159 4.710188
Mean dependent 0.485237 5.035357 138.3936 6.378878 78.26696
S.D. dependent 0.753079 1.580861 27.51050 0.575987 29.97257
Determinant Residual Covariance 2.57E-08
Log Likelihood 1288.520




Observations: 784 after adjusting endpoints
Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses
35Table VII
Vector Error Correction Model (9 lags)




Nobs, Nvars = 783, 47
Variable Coefﬁcient t-statistic t-probability
Slope lag1 -6.720091 -2.481797 0.013294
Slope lag2 -5.640850 -2.004024 0.045433
Slope lag3 -2.586794 -0.907883 0.364237
Slope lag4 -3.763347 -1.322715 0.186341
Slope lag5 -4.332474 -1.520286 0.128869
Slope lag6 -1.371577 -0.482491 0.629601
Slope lag7 -1.599399 -0.557754 0.577182
Slope lag8 3.311959 1.155466 0.248275
Slope lag9 2.443324 0.860766 0.389647
LIBOR lag1 2.637748 1.336462 0.181811
LIBOR lag2 0.646487 0.325533 0.744870
LIBOR lag3 -0.208390 -0.104711 0.916634
LIBOR lag4 -1.283006 -0.642726 0.520602
LIBOR lag5 -1.462799 -0.734644 0.462790
LIBOR lag6 0.393509 0.196700 0.844117
LIBOR lag7 2.067015 1.032362 0.302242
LIBOR lag8 -1.875139 -0.957136 0.338813
LIBOR lag9 6.479600 3.434701 0.000626
Credit lag1 0.081406 1.818241 0.069434
Credit lag2 0.038491 0.845240 0.398251
Credit lag3 0.057742 1.262720 0.207090
Credit lag4 -0.012232 -0.267772 0.788950
Credit lag5 -0.046596 -1.023527 0.306395
Credit lag6 -0.054928 -1.210981 0.226291
Credit lag7 -0.057081 -1.256280 0.209413
Credit lag8 -0.093762 -2.071600 0.038651
Credit lag9 -0.062121 -1.423496 0.155016
Duration lag1 -2.578268 -1.311069 0.190243
Duration lag2 0.059802 0.030115 0.975984
Duration lag3 -5.674787 -2.835361 0.004703
Duration lag4 -2.550503 -1.268191 0.205131
Duration lag5 3.707602 1.843989 0.065586
36Variable Coefﬁcient t-statistic t-probability
Duration lag6 -3.497995 -1.731046 0.083863
Duration lag7 -3.688239 -1.825615 0.068313
Duration lag8 1.220529 0.602670 0.546914
Duration lag9 3.413469 1.712416 0.087241
SwapSprd lag1 0.043277 0.960176 0.337282
SwapSprd lag2 -0.079331 -1.749199 0.080673
SwapSprd lag3 -0.132713 -2.925544 0.003544
SwapSprd lag4 -0.001671 -0.036638 0.970784
SwapSprd lag5 -0.027113 -0.599847 0.548793
SwapSprd lag6 -0.014499 -0.322006 0.747540
SwapSprd lag7 0.006598 0.147241 0.882983
SwapSprd lag8 0.094270 2.102953 0.035809
SwapSprd lag9 -0.027707 -0.619063 0.536067
ec term Slope -0.021285 -0.276491 0.782249
constant -0.063273 -0.320543 0.748648
************** Granger Causality Tests **************
Variable F-value Probability
Slope 2.043143 0.032398
LIBOR 1.988137 0.038025
Credit 2.221313 0.019066
Duration 2.711262 0.004117
SwapSprd 1.994756 0.037303
37